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INTRODUCTION 
LIThe problem 
The imroducLion of workplace forums by the I.RA in South Africa was 
meant 'to [itcilil3te a shift, at the workplace, from adversaria! collective 
bargaining to jOint problem-solving and participation on cerrain matters'.: 
This attempt met with strong resistance from the trade unions, which 
feared unwanted competition and a significant weakening of the trade 
union movement. Therefore, the original draft had [Q be changed in order 
to gain acceptability, The initiation and control of the workplace forums 
were put into the hands of representative trade unions (ie, trade unions 
representing a majority of employees at the workplace)" and collective 
bargaining became the instrument to extend the powers of the workplace 
forums." 
This, however, failed to destroy the fears of the trade unions which Du 
Toit, Godfrey and Jordan once labelled 'fear of the unknown',' This fear 
nOl only explains the very modest success of workplace forums thus far;" 
it also explains why proposed amendments where not passed in 2002 
according to which (a) a registered trade union could have applied to 
establish a workplace forum in a workplace in which the majority of em-
ployees were not trade union members, provided [he application was sup~ 
ported by a majority of employees in the workplace; (b) the majority of 
employees in a workplace in which there was no registered trade union 
See Explanatory Memorandum (0 [he Drat! Nego[JJting jloculIlent in [he Form of (I 
Labour Relations Bill (GN 97 in Government Gazelle No 16259 d(lled 10 February 1995 
(I[ 135-1 1H. 
2 S 7H. Labour I{elarioll~ Act 66 of 1995 ('Lr\A·j. 
3 For this development sec Weiss M Innovation liurch Cewrz! . j)as neue AriJeitsrechr In 
Slledrifrika, in HD Assrnann et alii ed Wlrtschaf!s" und Medienrecht in der demokratie, 
Heidelberg (1997). 59 et Sf'1j 
1 Du Toil D. Godfrey S (lnd J()rdaarl H 'Workplace forullls in comparalive perspective' 
:WOQ, unpublished research report for lhe South Africa Netherlands Project on Alterna-
tives in DeveloplIlenl (SAN PAD) 
5 See for example Barch;es; r 'Tr(:I(je {Hliom; and or.~<Hljsarional restructuring ill rhe Sowh 
African (lutomobile induslry A critique of Ille co-delermindlion thesis African -,>oelO-
luyical reVIew (1998) 2.2. where tht author not only descnbe" bUI SUrprJflS this bias. 
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could have applied to establish a workplace forum; and (c) it would have 
become possible to establish workplace forums in workplaces with fewer 
than 100 employees.' 
One of the most important findings of a recent study by the Sociology 
of Work Unit (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand is the fact 
that 'unions continue to regard workplace forums with considerable sus-
picion, fearful that they will undermine the role of the union'.' At the 
same time empirical studies show that employers' resistance to workplace 
forums results, among other reasons, from the belief that 'workplace 
forums will meet unions' interests but that employer interests will not be 
met,.8 This indicates that perception and reality somehow may be con-
fused: otherwise the contradiction between the fears on both sides cannot 
be explained, 
Since evidently there are not yet enough pilot projects which might 
transform (he irrationality of the trade unions' fears into a more rational 
discourse. (he question arises what input can be found after ten years to 
finally stimulate the implementation of workplace forums to a significant 
extent. Felicity Steadman in her brilliant essay, referred to above, suggests 
that 'further inquiry into international benchmarks is of little practical 
value". In spite of the fact that I am highly impressed by her analysis, on 
this point I strongly disagree. The study of foreign experience is always 
extremely helpful to question ideological positions. Of course such re-
search should not be seen as prOViding answers which simply might be 
transferred from one country to another. However, it is useful if it is 
understood as an indication that things elsewhere in the world might work 
differently than assumed, thereby providing food for thought on how 
experiences undergone in one country might be of some relevance to 
others.lo 
It IS in this spirit that I would like to refer to the experiences of trade 
unions with the system of institutionalised workers' participation in 
Germany. In order to present a fair assessment of this relationship it is 
necessary to start far back in history: in the nineteenth century, where the 
origins of the present system are to be found. 
1,2 The trade unions' early perceptions of institutionalised 
worker participation 
The most important and by far the strongest trade union movement in 
Germany in the nineteenth century was the socialist trade union move-
ment (or 'free trade unions'. as they also were called). II At least officially 
6 On these proposals see Steadman r 'Workpl.lce forums in SOlll1l Africa: A cri(ical ana-
lysis' (2004) 25Indllstri().! Law journal 1170 a( 1174. 
71lJidarl181 
8 Ibidat 1191. 
9 Ibidal 1182 
10 For (he meriLs of sllch all approach see Weiss M 'The hHure of comparative 1.lIJor law as 
an academic discipline and as .1 practical (001 Comparative I.abor Law & Policy Journal 
(2003) 25 a( 169 er seq (178 et seq) 
II For delails see GrelJing H Geschichte der delltschen Arbeilerbeweg/lng (1970) 61 e( seq. 
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(hey were focusing not on reforms but on the destruction of the capitalist 
system. In this ideologic~1 framework their proclaimed goal was to replace 
capitalism by socialism.IL On the rhetorical level reforms were considered 
to be a stabilising factor of the capitalist system. Therefore, the socialist 
trade union movement was trying to prepare for radical change by way of 
revolution. The main task in this context consisted of the creation of class 
consciousness among the workers. This explains why the socialist trade 
unions were not interested at all in structures which might lead to mere 
'company egoism', thereby destroying the solidarity of the workers as a 
class with a cornman interest. And it also explains why these trade un~ 
ions, in 1878, were prohibited by law.n This law, however, turned out to 
be ineffective.!~ The socialist trade union movement developed under~ 
cover activities in order to survive, which led, in the end, to a Significant 
strengthening of the movement and the abolition of this statute in 1890. 
i lowever, even if collective agreements from the perspective of the so-
cialist trade unions were considered to be pacts with the class enemy, pro-
viding unwanted legitimacy for the capitalist system, the unions turned 
out to be much more pragmatic in practice and already in the early 1870s 
- of course to a marginal extent - started concluding collective agree~ 
" ments 
It is important to know that bodies of workers' representation were not 
a creation of trade unions. The first steps in this direction were taken in 
the context of the political events of 1848, in the so-called' Parliament of 
the Paul's Church' of that year.
1b 
The members of this Parliament, how-
ever, were neither trade unionists nor workers but came from a bourgeOiS 
milieu, the majority of them being scholars. For reasons of promoting 
democracy in the workplace and for humanitarian reasons a draft docu-
ment on bodies of workers' participation was elaborated by a subcommit~ 
tee of the Parliament. Since, however, the Parliament as such had only a 
brief existence, (his draft had no further effect whatsoever. 
Bodies of workers' participation were first introduced on a voluntary 
basis by employers in some big companies since the early 1870s. This de~ 
velopment was mainly based on four reasons'"!: 
First, rules on workers' behaviour in the workplace were playing an 
ever-increasing role, and employees' resistance against sanctions for 
violation of such rules steadily was growing. Therefore, from an em~ 
ployer's perspective, the idea (Q increase legitimacy by transferring the 
12 Ibid al 100 et seq. 
! 3 Gesetz gegen die gemeingefallflichen BeslfctllHlgen der SoziCllder11okralie, Relcllsgesetz-
blall (187B) 21 at 3~J I et sel/ 
14 Sec Cirebing H (n [0 dbove) 7:1 
I ~J Sc(~ Seifert A UmJang und Crenzen der Zuliis5igkeit von tarijell)wdchemlen Betriebsverein-
harungen (2000) at 62 
16 ror a detailed assessmcnc of this dcveloprnerlt see Reichold H ·netripusvert"assung als 
Sozialprivatrecht' (1995) a( 10 et seq 
17 See tor this developlilent rreesc H Die konstitutionelle fabrik 4 ed (J 922): Schippcl M 
Arbf:'ltertlusschuess<, NeuE' Zeit (1890191) at J 29 etseq, rcprintcrl in Blanke T et (II ed f{()/~ 
lektives Arbeilsrecht- (}uellen{nle lIlr Geschu'hte des Arvel/srechls in Deutschland 18-JO -
1933. led (1975) at 86 et seq: Reichold II (n 15 above) at 98 et seq. 
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establishment and the sanctioning of these rules partly to the employees 
themselves seemed to offer a means of eliminating such conflicts.
IB 
Secondly, in the period before the introduction of the Bismarck social 
security system 1<; company schemes of social assistance in cases of sick~ 
ness, retirement etcetera, played an important role. However, these 
schemes implied significant administrative efforts which, from the em-
ployers' perspective, were burdensome but not profitable at all. Therefore 
it seemed a clever strategy to shift this burden to the employees them-
selves, transferring the administrative responsibility without changing the 
power structure in the company. 
Thirdly, the members of these representative bodies were not elected 
by the workforce but appointed by the employer. This meant, for them, a 
sort of promotion and tended to produce an attitude of gratefulness to the 
employer for having chosen them. Therefore, they could easily be used by 
the employer as instruments of communication, letting the employer 
know whether there were dangers of unrest within the workforce or 
whether individual workers were linked to the socialist trade unions, 
theres~ enabling the employer to counteract such activities in an early 
stage. 
The fourth reason for establishing such bodies was based on the idea 
that It promoted the integration of the employees into the company, cre-
ating among them a spirit of identification with the company and thereby 
keeping them away from the socialist trade unions. 
Against (his background it was no surprise at all that there was strong 
opposition from the socialist trade unions (as well as the Social~Demo~ 
cratic Party)21 when in 1891, with the support of a majority of the con~ 
servative parties, statutory rules were passed making it possible to intro-
duce representative bodies for workers in establishments of at least 
twenty employees," This opposition was not weakened by the fact that 
there was a significant difference between these bodies and those intro-
duced voluntarily by big companies since the I 870s: the representative 
bodies no longer were appointed by the employer but elected by the 
workforce of the establishment, and it was the workforce who decided 
whether such bodies should be elected or not 
The socialist trade unions' fundamental opposition to patterns of institu-
tionalised workers' participation, however, was relinquished in the course 
of the so-called 'strategy debate' which characterised the period around 
18 This legilirnilcy aspect is brilliantly demonstraled in the foreword by freese H (n 16 
above) 
19 In 1889 Cermany vecarne the first country in the world (0 establish il social insurance 
system, induding retirement and disability benefits. Driven lly Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, the purpose was to enhance the efficiency of [he economy and stave off caBs 
for mure radical reform - Editor. 
20 Schippel M (n 16 above) at 88, offers interesting examples in Lhis respect. 
21 This OpposiLion was brilliantly articulated by August Bebel in his speech in the Reichstag 
of 15 April 1891, 'Prowkolle des ReichsLags' aL 100. SiLZLJng, 21 ef :-;eq, reprinted in 
IJlankc T ef a[ (n 16 above) at 91 ef seq. 
22 For details of this law and iLS faCllk'll impact see Relchold H (n 15 above) a[ 125 el seq 
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(he turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century."' In this debate the 
maintenance of the existing revolutionary strategy was questioned as 
more effective alternative reformist strategies were suggested, not calling 
inw question the capitalist system as such but trying to give this system a 
more human face by legally restricting the employers' powers and by in-
troducing employees' involvement in management's dec[sion·making. 
Participation became one of the catchwords in this strategy as suggested 
by the reformists, After prolonged and very controversial debate, this 
strategy came to replace the former revolutionary philosophy of the so-
cialist trade union movement. This shift, of course, made it difficult to 
maintain a fundamentalist opposition against pauerns of institutionalised 
workers' participation. 
Another impact of the abandonment of revolutionary ideas was the rec-
ognition of trade unions (Including the socialist ones) as legitimate rep-
resentatives of the workforce by the employers' associations in a formal 
agreement signed in 1918 . .!~ In terms of this agreement collective bargain-
ing was agreed upon as being the predominant instrument of determining 
working conditions.;~ Thus, from the trade unions' perspective, the task 
was no longer to prevent patterns of institutionalised workers' participation 
but to work for a fruitful co-existence of the twO systems of representing 
employees' interests. Or, putting it differently: it was necessary to turn the 
works councils into an extended arm of the trade unions dt the workplace. 
This attempt is reflected in the first comprehensive statute of 1920 
establishing bodies of employees' representation, known as works coun-
cils, in all workplaces of at least twenty employees," The trade unions suc-
ceeded in inserting a section which guaranteed that their activities - in 
particular, collective bargaining - were not affected at all.·" This shows a 
certain tension between the basic acceptance of a system of institutional-
ised workers' participation on the one hand and the still-continuing mis-
[rust of it on the mher. 'H The trade unions' attitude was comparable to that 
of the South African trade unions when workplace forums were intro-
duced, In spite of the change of spirit provoked by the strategy debate, 
trade unions in [he beginning were still rather reluctant to co-operate with 
these newly established bodies, 
2.1 I;or this debate see Greuing II (n 10 above) at J 18 et sel/ 
21 ZentralarlleitsgenH:inschafrsvereinbarung zwisclwn Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmerver-
baenrjen (19 J 8) vom I G lJeursclrer Reichsanzeiger;il 271. 
25 S 6 of this agreenwnt Statl:S: ·Working corlditions for all workers are to be regulated by 
collective agreements according to the circumstances wittlin the different branches. . 
(translation by MW). 
26 Betriebsraetegesetz of 1 february 1920 8l:'ichsgf:'sl:'{zblatr at 147 e{ seq; the genesis of 
this stature is wdl described in Hemmer 110 'BetriebsraetegeseLz und Betricbsraete-
praxis in der Weirnarer Republik' in· 1I Borsdorf e( a/ eel Gewerkschqflliche Polilik: He-
form flUS So/idariIIJe! (J 977) al 241 f'l :;;eq (246 el sell) 
27 S(;r(iOll 8 or this statute reads as rollows: 'The cOnlpetem:e 01" employees' dssociations 
to represent (tie interests 01" ttieir llIerTllwrs is [lot to be affected by tile prOVisions ot" this 
stailite . (rranslation by MW). 
28 ror thl: cornplexity at" the trade unrons' tears see Brigl-Matthiass K iJ(lS Be(rieiJsmete-
prall/em in der Weimarer RepulJ/ik. Herlinll_eipZ/g (I ()26) reprinted In Crusius Ret a/ e(1 
iJle Ile/rlebsraelf.' In der We/mara Rrpubllk vol 2 (1978) a( 22 1.'1 seq 
161 
LAW. DEMOCRACY '" DEVELOPMENT 
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION 
However. in spite of all their initial reservations, the trade unions quickly 
learned how (0 use the works councils for their own purposes. Once such 
systems are in place the actors have to cope with them and to find out 
how to make the best use of them. This. perhaps. is the most important 
lesson to be learned from the German experience. In their day-to-day 
activities it turned out that works councils could be used very efficiently as 
a sort of police force for monitoring the implementation of collective 
agreements. This was extremely important in a situation where other 
mechanisms were not yet developed sufficiently to guarantee such im~ 
pie mentation. 
Works council members also felt the need for training to be adequately 
equipped for their tasks. This training was provided by the trade unions. 
which quickly discovered that this was an excellent tool for integrating the 
works councils into the trade union movement,2~ As will be shown later. 
training provided by trade unions has been the decisive instrument up to 
the present for integrating the works council system into the overall trade 
union strategy. 
In addition, to promote such co-operation, the trade unions more and 
more understood the importance of ensuring that the members of the 
works councils should be trade union members. Therefore they fought for 
a statutory amendment. passed in 1928. which allowed trade unions to 
present lists of candidates for the works councils' elections. 30 This was the 
beginning of a development which has been crucial to the relationship 
between trade unions and works councils. To a greater and greater extent. 
members of works councils have been members (and sometimes leading 
officials) of trade unions. Today the percentage ranges up to almost 90 per 
cent. The significance of this personal identity cannot be overestimated. It 
certainly is more important than any rule which tries to institutionally 
combine trade unions' and works councils' activities. 
The trade unions. in addition, quickly learned something else. Works 
council members, being constantly exposed to problems needing to be 
solved, acquired technical skills and developed a sort of professionalism 
which could be put to good use within the trade union movement. To be a 
profeSSionally skilled works council member meant, at the same time, 
being important to the trade union movement and able to make a career 
therein. This also has remained a characteristic feature to this day. 
following the destruction of the democratic system by the Nazi regime 
between 1933 and 1945, the works council system was re-established 
after the Second World War. As before. it remained institutionally sepa-
rate from the trade unions; it was and stili is exclusively up to the workers 
in a workplace whether they want a works counci!. no matter whether 
they are unionised or not. The co-operation between trade unions and 
29 See for a delailed analysis of liris srralegy Brigl,Ma"hia% K In 28 above) al ,,9 el .,eq . 
. 30 According to Ihc sra!islics at [he dccrions in 1930,94.1 % of the works council mem-
bers were also [rade union members: see POjJP L 'J)<:IS Iklricbsraelewcscn in dcr Praxis' 
ifl" Crusius Ret aI, op cit, vol J 232 el seq (234). 
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works councils, however, not only cominued but was strengthened. The 
Statute on Works Councils (first passed in I 952,~' replaced by the Statute 
of 1972 3) and amended several limes since then, most recently in 200 I '\ 
establishing works councils in all establishments with at least five employ~ 
ees, now promotes this co-operation by providing a whole set of instru-
ments giving the trade unions formal powers La influence the works coun-
cil system.l~ First, the trade unions are able to initiate the election of a 
works council by calling a workforce meeting to decide this question by 
majority vote. Secondly. the trade unions have the power (Q monitor the 
functioning of the system by having access to the labour court if the works 
council's election is not conducted according to the rules. Elections can in 
that even( be nullified, members of the works council expelled and works 
councils dissolved. Thirdly and more importantly, however, the trade 
unions have possibilities of prOViding support (0 works councHs. To give 
just a few examples: external trade union officials have a right of access (Q 
the establishmem's premises - whelher the employer likes it or not - in 
order to assist the works council in performing its tasks; the works council 
as well as its 5ubcommiHees are entitled to request the presence and 
assistance of an external trade union official; external trade unions have a 
right to be present in workplace meetings, etcetera. Similarly, expert 
knowledge to which the works council is entitled under certain conditions 
is quite often provided by experts coming from the trade union system. 
Fourthly, as was already the case in the period between 1920 and 1933, 
there is an educational link which is most important in this context. 
According to the Statute on Works Councils the works council members 
arc entitled to training courses in which they are supposed to learn what 
they need to know in order to perform their tasks. To begin with, rhere 
Was a big discussion on the scope of subjects to be taught in such 
courses.·1S The controversy was finally resolved by the rederal Labour 
Court,V, which ruled that all legal, economic and general topics which 
might be relevant for the performance of works council members' duties 
can be included. As a result, works council members receive a broad edu~ 
cation empowering [hem to be efficient actors. Almost all these courses 
are offered by the trade unions at special schools where they train their 
own officials and also offer the courses for works councils. Impressive 
curricula have been developed, using the most modern pedagogic tools. 
Through this medium the trade unions dispose over an excellent instru-
ment to inform works council members on how to perform their duties in 
a way that is in line with trade union strategy and to communicate with 
them on issues of common interest. 
1 [ HetridJ.werfassungsgeSf'lZ J I october 1952 Bl1ndesgcsetzblatt 1052 L 68 J 1:1 seq. 
12 Bernebsvertassungsgeseu. 1:J january 1972 Bunriesgeselzbla/{ 19:12 I. 1"5 et seq 
33 25 septernber 2001 Bunrles9PselZlJlaf( 2001 1,25[8 et seq. 
34 For d curnprehcnsive overvIew Dr lhesc righls and their faClual implica(ions sec DacutJ-
In W (Jewerkscharlsr~chte 1m Bemel; 9 ed (! (98) 
35 ['or problerns arising in this contexr sec Oacublcr W Schull/nil und For/bi/dlmg von 8e-
rriebsratsmirglwdern llndjuyendverlrelern nar:h 9.37 BetrVG 3 ed (1978) 
36 See thc Judgement of the Federal Labour COlin or I [ dccembn 1973. EzA Nr [<) ZLI 
§ 37 Belriebsverfassungsgesclz 1972 
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3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE UNIONS AND WORKS 
COUNCILS TODAY 
The changes in the institutional framework and the pragmatic attempt to 
optimise the co-existence of trade unions and works councils have led to 
significant features which nowadays characterise the relationship between 
the two actors. Most important are the following: 
First. there is a very important division of labour. Trade unions put their 
energies into sectoral colleClive bargaining, thereby selling minimum 
standards For a whole sector or at least a region of it, and leaving the day-
to-day arrangements in the company to the works councils. To give just 
one practical example: the trade unions succeeded by means of collective 
bargaining in reducing the weekly working time in order to distribute the 
available work to more persons. Then, of course. it became necessary to 
ensure that this goal was not counteracted by too much overtime work. 
Works councils are in a position to monitor this in each establishment. 
Since they have a right of co-determination in this respect. which means 
in essence that the employer cannot do anything withoU[ their consent. 
works councils can prevent excessive over~time work. The trade unions. 
on the other hand, would have been much weakened if they had to put 
their energies imo activities such as these at a micro level. 
Secondly, collective agreements provide a framework to be filled in by 
works councils and individual employers. Sectoral bargaining remains im-
portant to promote a macro perspective in the determination of minimum 
standards in (he different branches of economic activity. However. due to 
the evcr~growing differences among individual enterprises, rigid rules in 
collective agreements have turned out to be increasingly inappropriate. As 
a result. collective agreements have become more flexible, providing 
through so-called 'opening clauses' significant lee-way for works councils 
and individual employers to regulate the implementation thereof by 
means of works agreements.)' To give another example: collective agree~ 
ments determine the average working time to be reached in a sector with-
in a certain period, This means that, in practice. it is up to works councils 
and employers to decide by way of work agreements how the working 
time in each workplace will be distributed within such period. It has to be 
admitted that this efficient interrelationship between collective agree-
ments and works agreements is a rather recent phenomenon which can 
be seen as the result of a prolonged learning process. However. it serves 
to promote the development of structural patterns within a sector as a 
whole as well as the necessary flexibility at workplace level. 
Thirdly. it has turned out that difficult restructuring processes can only 
be carried out successfully on the basis of close co-operation between 
trade unions and works councils. This seems to be the only way to get 
enough legitimacy - not only among trade union members but among the 
workforce as a whole - for concessions to be made in order to safeguard 
37 On [hl$ illiCrrela(ioll see Weiss M and Schmidr M Labour law and industrial relatIOns in 
Germany 3 ed (2000) al 206 ec seq. 
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the future of existing jobs, Recent examples in prestigious companies 
such as Daimler-Chrysler, Volkswagen, Opel and Siemens teach very im-
pressive lessons in this respect. 
Fourthly, in companies where works coundls are established, trade 
unions are significantly better represented than in companies without 
works councils. According to the law it is irrelevant for the election and 
the Functioning of a works council whether a trade union is represented in 
the establishment. This, however, is pure theory and has no bearing on 
reality. The trade union, as an informal supporter of (he works council 
system, offers employees the necessary information on the advantages of 
having a works council and thereby stimulates the election of such a body. 
The fact that trade unions are more or less absent in small and medium-
sized companies, therefore, explains why, in spite of the law (which re-
quires works councils in establishments of at least five employees), no 
works councils are elected in many small and medium-sized establish-
ments above this threshold. j~ 
Fifthly, works councils in practice have turned out to be very efficient in 
recrUiting members for the trade unions by using all kinds of informal 
strategies. Without the works councils the membership problem for the 
German trade unions would have been much bigger than it actually is. The 
trade unions themselves today consider works councils to be a decisive 
pillar of their strength.3~ In the employees' perception the works council 
represents the trade union in the workplace: they do not draw the sophis-
ticated distinction which the law suggests by insisting on an institutional 
separation The mere existence of a works council tends to create a 
climate in the establishment which makes the employees more inclined to 
abide to collective structures. thereby paving the way for actual trade 
union membership. 
The sixth and, perhaps, most imponant feature in th is context is the 
works councils' innovative input imo the trade union system. Works coun-
cils are confronted with ever-changing day-to-day problems and are thereby 
38 According (0 it study on Whlet. the legislcHure based its reasoning for lhe arn(!ndnH!nls 
ot 2001, works eOlHlcils were eleClt!d in only 4% of eSlablishments with be (ween 5 and 
20 employees and in only 28 % or (~sr(1tJlishrnents with tJelwecn 21 and 100 ernployees' 
Bundeslays-Drucks(1che 14/5741 et ;,;eq. Due 10 [he tact (hal [he amendment raCililarcd 
lhe elenion procedure in small and fw:diurtl-sized cornpanit~s the sitlJation seems to 
have improved slightly. Tile figures of [he latest works council elecrion show (ila( works 
COlIflClls were formed in 7 % of eSlablishments wi(h be (ween 5 and 49 employees and 
56% ot" esratJilshnlerllS wl(h be (ween 50 and 249 employees: Ahlers E/Ziegler A Job-
Motor Kleinbetrieb ein TrugschlllSS Eine betriebsbezogene Auswenung der WS1-
Betriebsraelebefragung, WSI Mil(eilungen (2004) at 41 et seq (43). However, since the 
reference samples are nOI iden(ical, i( is ditt"icul( 10 say wile(iler (here is really an im-
provement. 
39 What {ieorg Flalow wrote in 1931 is even more (fue IOday. 'Only where strong (rade 
unions exisl a strong works council struoure evolved ot which the rritde unions signiri-
cantly benet"i[" Fla[ow C 'Be(riebsraeiC' in /n{prnariona/es handfJllch de;,; Gewerkschafts-
wesens Heyde L ed vol J (J 9"3 I) iH 227 et seq (21 J) (translation by MW). For n good 
i:lssessrllt'~nl ot loday's co·eXls(eno-: of (tle (WO pillars see Daeublcr W 'Einleitung' in 
Daeubler W/Ki(rner M ed Re(rVC 9 ed (2004) Rdnr. 54. 
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forced to develop strategies even if the relevant trade union bodies have 
not yet agreed on a common approach. The spectrum of such problems 
ranges from questions posed by new technology or new work organis-
ation to questions presented by the ever-Increasing segmentation and 
Fragmentation of the workForce within establishments. Due to the pres-
sure from works councils, quite a few trade union congresses on the fe· 
newal of trade union strategies and trade union organisation have taken 
place. The input by the works councils in the debates of these congresses 
can hardly be overestimated Seen from this perspective, the works 
councils are a very important stimulus to make SUfe that the trade unions 
stay up to date and able to cope with new challenges." 
These few examples may be sufficient to demonstrate that the original 
mistrust between trade unions and works councils has turned into an 
almost symbiotic co-operation, thereby strengthening both pillars of the 
system of employees' representation. For the trade unions works council 
have in some ways become a guarantee of their survival as relevant 
actors. 
4 CONCLUSION 
As shown above, it took rather a long time in Germany until the relation-
ship between (rade unions and works councils became a sort of 'love 
story'. Initially the structures seemed incompatible. This, however, is the 
important message: trade unions in a pragmatic way learned how to cope 
with the challenge and thereby to optimise the functioning of the system 
of workers' representation as a whole. This, of course, was only made 
possible by the jointly accepted understanding that collective bargaining 
and workers participation fulfil different functions, that the one cannot 
simply be substituted for the other, and that each has merits of its own. 
Whether and how far this message is of any relevance in the South Afri-
can context is difficult to say. It is self-evident that conditions in South 
Africa and in Germany are very different and that these differences imply 
different institutional arrangements, which in South Africa WIll need to be 
developed in the context of the overall situation within the country. This, 
however. is not the issue here. The question remains whether it might not 
be worthwhile to at least open the door to gaining some experience of the 
co-existence between trade unions and workplace-based representative 
bodies. The history of industrial relations - and this is shown by the 
German example, as sketched above - is a history of trial and error. There 
has to be the courage to experiment if progress is to be achieved; and 
there has to be a pragmatiC instead of a dogmatiC approach. The Labour 
Relations Act is offering only the possibility of establishing workplace 
forums. In the last analysis it IS up to the South African trade unions to 
shape them in a way which optimises the mechanism of workers' rep-
resentation as a whole. The German experience does not indicate how to 
40 See for this aspect Daeubler W "Emlei(ung' ir} DaeUbler W/Kitrner M ed BetrVCi 9 ed 
(2004) Rdnr. 57, 110. 
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do ie It only indicares that the collaboration between trade unions and in-
stitutionalised workers' participation can work in spite of initial ideological 
barriers. My hope is that this message is not ignored in South Africa. 
The lesson for South Africa, therefore, is not that the path to be fol-
lowed is the same as in Germany. However, [he lesson might be that it 
would be worthwhile to try to find out whether, under South African con-
ditions, a fruitful interaction between trade unions and workplace forums 
could be achieved, resulting in a strengthening of both channels of rep-
resentation. Any proposals in this direction require dose familiarity with 
the conditions in South Africa which I as a foreigner do not have. 
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